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BOOK REVIEWS
THE LAw OF AWOL. By Alfred Avins.1 New York: Oceana Publica-
tions, 1957. Pp. xxxi, 288. $4.95. To general practitioners of the law it
may appear novel that since the adoption of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice2 in 1950 several texts and case books 4 have been
published devoted exclusively to the subject of military law. To these,
and even to some members of the profession who may have had occasion
to appear in courts-martial proceedings, it may come as quite a surprise
that one single article of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 5 has now
evoked a volume of some two hundred and fifty pages, exclusive of index
and tables. Be that as it may, Mr. Alfred Avins has at this length
addressed himself to the military offense of absence without leave.
While the civilian offense of vagrancy may be contrasted with the
military offense of absence without leave in that the former is objection-
able presence and the latter objectionable absence, the two are similar
in that in magnitude each is a very wee flower in the garden of crime.
Vagrancy, consigned as it is to police courts from which appeals are
indeed a rarity, has largely exfoliated without generating legal literature.
Conversely, absence without leave, doubly blessed with a built-in federal
question and now with the United States Court of Military Appeals as
its ultimate forum, has proliferated into a luxuriant legal verbiage. 6 What
the offense of absence without leave lacks in gravity in the individual
case it makes up in the aggregate by its incessant repetition. As the
author points out, it comprises more than half of all military offenses
committed.7
The fundamental fact is that no effective military organization can
permit unauthorized absences to go unchallenged. The shirking of duty
to pursue personal desires breaks down esprit and teamwork. Military
persons who need leave for emergency or compassionate reasons have
recourse to Chaplains, Inspector Generals and the Red Cross in those
rare instances where leave is not granted at once by the immediate
commander. A person in any of the military services who through
inadvertence, or otherwise, finds himself absent without leave may
terminate that status by reporting into any of our armed forces' stations
anywhere. Enlightened leave policies have all but eliminated "hard
cases" but, unfortunately, have not substantially reduced absence without
leave. In pursuing the subject it is important to have this in mind.
1 Member of the New York, Florida,, District of Columbia and Military
Appeals Bars. Former Special Deputy Attorney-General of New York State.
2 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 10 U.S.C. § 801 (Supp. 1957).
3 PHmLOS, HANDBOOK OF COURT-MARTIAL LAW (1951); PmLOS, HANDOOK
OF COURT-MARTIAL LAW (Supp. 1953); SNEDEKER, MILrrARY JUSTICE UNDER THE
UNIFORMf CODE (1953); AYCOCK AND WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (1955).
4 MILITARY JURISPRUDENCE (1951); SCHILLER, MILITARY LAW (1952); WALKER,
MILITARY LAW (1954).
5 70A STAT. 67 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 886 (Art. 86) (Supp. 1957).
6 Court Martial Reports, vols. 1 to 22 inclusive, which report Board of Review
opinions of all four services and Court of Military Appeals decisions for the period
1951-57, devote some ten pages of index alone to absence without leave.
7 AvrNs, THE LAW OF AWOL 34 (1957).
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The experienced military lawyer will be both gratified and bewildered
by Mr. Avins' introduction. Cause for gratification is the brief historical
treatment which traces the offense back to the fourteenth century.8 In
these latter days there is some tendency to assume that all military
offenses originated with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and were
not legitimated until thereafter approved by the Court of Military
Appeals. Every historical account which dispels such callow thinking
is commendable. Cause for bewilderment is use of the term "AWOLism." 9
Equated to civilian absenteeism and uttered by a sociologist this nomen-
clature might possibly pass muster, along with "momism." Used as a
legal criminal expression one can only hope it is not contagious and will
not spread to "murderism" and "rapeism."
One more tussle with semantics is indicated. At page 125 the reader
is confronted fourteen times with "AWOLee" which, from the context,
appears to be used to mean one who commits absence without leave.
Agreement can probably be reached that "vendor" means one who sells,
and "vendee" one to whom something is sold. From this it would seem
that one who commits absence without leave is an "AWOLor" and that
"AWOLee" might apply to the lady visited by an "AWOLor," or to his
First Sergeant who finds him absent. Sifting the word pile a bit more we
find that one who commits a murder is not a "murderor" nor is a
murder victim called a "murderee." Perhaps one who commits absence
without leave should not be denominated either "AWOLee" or
"AWOLor."
As a preliminary the author very properly distinguishes absence with-
out leave from the offenses of desertion,' 0 missing movement," mis-
conduct in the face of the enemy,12 escape from confinement,"3 and
failure to obey a lawful order,14 while indicating that under varying
circumstances these offenses may be closely related. Frequently the
offense of failure to obey a lawful order is discussed per se, 15 and
connected only by stating that had the accused been charged with
absence without leave, instead of failure to obey, he should or should not
have been found guilty. These discussions, while interesting, appear to be
somewhat collateral. Conversely, a remarkable feat is performed in
divorcing the offense of absence without leave from desertion. Consider-
ing the innumerable cases in which courts-martial, by exceptions and
substitutions, find an accused not guilty of desertion, but guilty of the
lesser included offense of absence without leave, one may question the
wisdom of completely segregating the two. However, as the author
8 Id. at 35-38.
9 Id. at 33.
10 70A STAT. 67 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 885 (Art. 85)(Supp. 1957).
11 70A STAT. 67 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 887 (Art. 87)(Supp. 1957).
12 70A STAT. 69 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 899 (Art. 99) (Supp. 1957).
13 70A STAT. 69 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 895 (Art. 95) (Supp. 1957).
14 70A STAT. 68 (1956), 10 U.S.C. §892 (Art. 92) (Supp. 1957).
15 This occurs at p. 141; in the chapter on "The Problems of Communication"
beginning at p. 97; in practically all the chapter on "Mistake of Fact" commencing
at p. 188; again in most of the chapter on "Illegality" starting on p. 207; and in
the chapter on "Ambiguity of Duty" beginning at p. 248.
660 [Vol. X>ZxiII
BOOK REVIEWS
points out in his Preface, no solution of the amaranthine problem of
what material to include and what to exclude is likely to win unanimous
acclaim..
Chapter I of Part II points out that only those in the military service
may commit the offense of absence without leave. This is, of course,
implicit in the language of article 86 which commences with the words,
"Any member of the Armed forces who, . ..".s Punitive articles which
also apply to those civilians who under article 2 are subject to courts-
martial jurisdiction, commence with the words, "Any person subject to
this code. .. 17 In cases of aiding the enemy or spying, for which anyone
may be tried by courts-martial, the articles commence concisely with,
"Any person who ..... 18
In the discussion of when absence begins the following statement
appears:
The AWOL of a draftee called to active military duty begins when the
time he is required to report arrives and he had not reported, for a person
who fails to report for military duty at the time required is absent from
military control and hence AWOL from that time (OPS JAG 1918, Vol.
Ii, P. 535 [July 5, 1918]; U.S. v. McIntyre, 4 F.2d 823 [1925]).19
This simply is not now the law. In 1944 in Billings v. Truesdell20 the
United States Supreme Court held a court-martial did not have jurisdic-
tion to try a draftee who refused to take the induction oath and that
recalcitrant draftees who refuse to be inducted are subject to criminal
prosecution in federal district court for a violation of the Selective
Training and Service Act of September 16, 1940. Furthermore, under
present law a draftee, until fully inducted, is not a "member of the
armed forces" and so cannot commit absence without leave. The un-
fortunate textual statement to the contrary might lead the unwary into
jurisdictional error.
The author devotes a chapter to discussing "leave." It is significant to
observe that Article 86 in defining the offense does not use the word
"leave," but uses instead the phrase, "absence without authority." The
text says:
... various members of the armed services are authorized to grant them-
selves leave. Such leave is a good defense to a charge of AWOL.
16 70A STAT. 67 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 886 (Art. 86) (Supp. 1957).
17 For example, 70A STAT. 72 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 918 (Art. 118) (Supp. 1957)
which denounces the offense of murder. This jurisdicition over civilians is now
subject to such inroads as may have been made thereon by the Supreme Court in
its eight judge, three-way-split, after-rehearing, decision in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957).
18 70A STAT. 70, 71 (1956), 10 U.S.C. §§ 904, 906 (Arts. 104, 106) (Supp.
1957).
19 AviNs, THE LAW op AWOL 93 (1957).
20 321 U.S. 542 (1944). The Court distinguishes the McIntyre case on which
the author relies. After stating that the McIntyre result ". . . was indeed the con-
sequence under the Selective Service Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 761)," it continued,
"... but the present Act and the regulations promulgated under it are differently
designed." Id. at 546. The Court concluded, ". . . where Congress has drawn the
line between civil 'and military jurisdiction it is our duty to respect it." Id. at 559.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Corrigan v. Secretary of Army,
211 F.2d 293 (9th-Cir. 1954), following Billings, reaches the same result under




* . . as a person rises in rank he is permitted to grant himself leave for
more extended periods of time.2 1
While to an exceedingly limited extent this is so, it would be prudent
to make clear that such authority, at least so far as the Army is con-
cerned, is the very rare exception rather than the rule, does not pertain
to enlisted men at all, and seldom indeed to officers. The author's broad
statement in this regard could, in the hands of those not versed in leave
procedures or of guardhouse lawyers, produce erroneous advice and
induce violations of article 86. There appears to be some confusion
between the term "leave" and the concept of geographical freedom to
move about in the performance of duty. The text under review states:
. . . the authority of a person to grant himself leave may be enlarged
when he is absenting himself on government business. 22
When a military person absents himself from his normal place of duty,
but is still in the performance of government business within the general
scope of his authority, he is not granting himself leave, but is actively
performing duty. The reason he is not violating article 86 is because he is
performing his duty, not because he has granted himself leave. Such a
person can hardly be said to be "absent" in the sense of article 86.
Whether, in a given set of circumstances, a military person is in fact
discharging authorized government (that is, his employer's) business, as
distinguished from being engaged on a frolic of his own, may be as
difficult to adjudge as is this same problem in civil life in the law of
agency.
This leads to a further word of caution. The author tends to rely on
digest opinions of line-of-duty board determinations that death gratuities
or pay are collectible under a given set of facts as being conclusive that
these facts do not violate article 86.23 At least in recent years, army
line-of-duty findings have been as heavily weighted in favor of the
individual as the proverbial tilting of insurance law for the insured
against the insurer. The risk involved is similar to that of indiscriminately
applying an insurance contract decision to contracts in general.
24
Issue must be taken with the statement that:
.. . where a person, compelled to be absent, has gone to all reasonable
lengths to get leave, only to be refused, the law gives him leave . . .25
The two cases cited for this proposition are merely exercises of clemency
and do not enunciate a doctrine of granting leave by operation of law. In
the first, an East Indian commander in 1819, in disapproving a proceed-
21 AviNs, THE LAw oF AWOL 90 (1957). Army Regulations No. 630-5, 5 Nov.
1957, as changed 7 Feb. 1958, as changed 28 Feb. 1958, prescribe basic army leave
policies.
22 Ibid.
23 Id. at 91, 92, 95, 96, 130, 227, 273.
24 Mr. Avins has recognized, in another context, this very dificulty:
. . . the leading case advancing the doctrine that a soldier detained by civil
authorities while AWOL remains AWOL, regardless of his guilt or innocence
of the charge ... was a civil suit for back pay, properly determined on contract
principles, and not a criminal AWOL case.
Erroneously, failing to perceive that the law of AWOL is not based on contract,
courts-martial followed this case in criminal AWOL cases. Id. at 153.
25 AviNs, THE LAW OF AWOL 93 (1957).
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ing in which a sepoy was convicted of deserting to get married, said
the circumstances ". . . ought to have been taken into consideration as
greatly extenuating the prisoner's offense." 26 In the second, the Army
Judge Advocate General in a new trial proceeding held:
* . . The evidence legally supports the findings of guilty and the sentence.
. . . Trial and punishment for desertion under these circumstances was
manifestly unjust.
. . The findings of guilty and the sentence will be vacated.27
It must be remembered that military reviewing authorities have wide
clemency powers and may exercise them by disapproving or vacating
findings and sentences. To elaborate a substantive rule of the law of
absence without leave from such clemency action is similar to changing
the elements of burglary because criminal courts in civil life frequently
grant burglars probation without the execution of sentence. Yet of these
cases the author says, "In both cases, the accused must be held to have
had leave by. operation of law on account of the compelling necessity
for his absence."'28 It is submitted that the authorities cited do not so
hold.
Another statement regarding leave draws fire. In discussing an army
case which "... held that a section head lacked authority to grant leave
because he was only concerned with accused's activities during duty
hours . . ..." it is said this case seems, ". . . clearly erroneous, as there
appears to be no reason for holding that the [officer] involved [was]
under a personal disability." 29 .Army enlisted men who wbrk in staff
sections of a tactical, area, or post headquarters are assigned either to a
Headquarters Company or a Headquarters Detachment which is different
from the staff section in which they work. Their records and administra-
tion are maintained by this Headquarters Company and only the com-
manding officer thereof may grant them a pass or leave. Standing in-
spection, guard, and other routine duties are performed in the Head-
quarters Company in addition to the clerical duties performed in the
staff section. To insure coordination of leave an enlisted man so assigned
must obtain prior concurrence from his section chief, but the leave is
granted only by the Headquarters Company commander. This procedure,
designed to prevent conflicting orders, is well known and would not
produce bona fide confusion. It is not that the section chief suffers "a
personal disability" in such cases, but simply that he is not the leave-
granting authority.
The author makes a plea on principle that a person already absent
without leave who is arrested, confined, and thereafter either convicted
or acquitted by civil authority, should not have such confinement time
included in his period of absence without leave because to do so is either
to punish him twice for his civil offense or twice for no offense at all.30
this argument ignores Blockburger v. United States3' in which the
Supreme Court announced the rule that:
... where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 94-5.
28' Id. at 95.
29 Id. at 231. Referring to CM 302839, Tursi, 58 BR 363 (1946).
30 Id. at 155, 159, 160.
81 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
which the other does not.32
The gravamen of the military offense is that without proper authority
the military person is not present to perform his military duty. These
facts, essential to the corpus delicti of absence without leave, are not
elements of any civil offense. Furthermore, even assuming the acts to be
identical, civil prosecution for a state law violation does not preclude
trial by court-martial if federal law was also violated.33
Although this reviewer must declare diffident dissent from some of
the conclusions of the author, Mr. Avins has brought to light valuable
historical material and has approached the law of absence without leave
from a fresh and unfettered point of view.3 4 While this book is not
likely to be accepted as full gospel in Judge Advocate sections, it will
certainly there, and in many a wardroom, engender lively discussions
and bring on re-examination of established doctrines in the law of absence
without leave. Such fomentation is all to the good. This volume merits
careful reading by students of the subject. The author is to be congratul-
ated upon his analysis and exposition of this important segment of
military law.
Seymour W. Wurfel*
32 Id. at 304.
33 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATFS 103 (1951), which states
the rule as follows:
... The same acts when committed in a State may constitute two distinct offenses,
one against the United States and the other against the State. In such a case trial
by a State court does not bar trial by courtimartial.
34 For example, Mr. Avins expresses non-concurrence in a Board of Review
opinion: "Next the Board will have Congressional Medal of Honor winners con-
fined in guardhouses." Avrls, op. cit. supra at 274. What a mischevious thought!
* Colonel, JAGC
THE SUPREME COURT IN MODERN ROLE. By Carl Brent Swisher.'
New York: New York University Press, 1958. Pp. vii, 214. $4.95.
Constitutional development is a theme long familiar 2 to Carl Brent
Swisher, whose 1957 James Stokes Lectures on Politics delivered at
New York University 3 are now made available in book form. These
lectures are largely concerned with the same theme, with particular
attention being directed to the role of the Supreme Court in such develop-
ment during the period from 1935 to 1956. References to important
decisions since 1956 are briefly discussed in the notes, which unfortun-
ately have been relegated to the back of the book.4
1 Professor of Political Science, John Hopkins University.
2 He is he author of AMERicAN CONSTITrrTIONAL DvEELOPMENT (2d ed. 1954).
3 Text at vi.




Four general problem areas in which the Court operates have been
selected for discussion in the lectures. Much of importance and general
interest is, of course, necessarily omitted. There is, for example, no
mention of the problems of Church and State with which the Court was
confronted during the period covered by the book. But most of the
highly important problems in the four areas in question are competently
and lucidly presented and the Court's solution sympathetically explained.
The four general areas in question are: limitations on governmental
power, the prevention and punishment of subversive activities, legal
control of military affairs and functions, and finally, race relations. The
author's purpose is by discussion of these four areas to illuminate "the
essential nature of the judicial process in the operations"5 of the Supreme
Court.
Before entering into his treatment of recent problems, Professor
Swisher provides a brief historical essay entitled "The Court and the
Sweep of History," which, while covering what is well known territory
for many, recalls events and doctrines of constitutional history that
seemingly cannot be re-emphasized too often. One could hardly find
thirty pages of printed material better designed to supply that modicum
of historical background which is essential for the student of constitution-
al law if he is to have any real grasp of the subject. Much of the recent
ill-informed criticism of the Court would not have occurred if more
people were aware of the plain facts related in this first chapter of the
book.
The second chapter, entitled "Checkreins upon Government," is con-
cerned with the Court's role in applying those provisions of the Con-
stitution that specifically limit governmental power: Article I, sections
9 and 10, the Bill of Rights, and the post-Civil War amendments. Here
in brief is the story of due process of law and the shift of emphasis from
the protection of property to the protection of people. The controversial
preferred position of freedom of speech and the equally contorversial
claim that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the safeguards of the
Bill of Rights are explained.
The third chapter, entitled "The Threat of Subversion," is, of course,
devoted primarily to the line of cases from SchenckO and Gitlow7 to
Denniss and to the clear and present danger doctrine and its various
applications. The law of treason, loyalty and security programs, de-
naturalization, exclusion, and deportation cases are also treated. The
author emphasizes the complexities of the Court's task in this area, He
points to the difficulty "derived from the lack of clear demarcation
between loyalty and patriotism on the one hand and disloyalty and sub-
version on the other."9 He cites the familiar example of sympathy with
Communism in the 1930's and thereafter which in many instances did
not denote "basic disloyalty to the United States, as was later assumed
by professional red-baiters: it marked rather a deep disillusionment with
s Text at vi.
6 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
9 Text at 101.
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control in the United States by an element that permitted, and presum-
ably could not have prevented within the pattern of its own ideology,
)the great depression that devastated the country before the advent of
the New Deal."' 0 The rest of what he says on this score is well worth
noting and is recommended to all readers who are interested in public
affairs.
The fourth chapter, entitled "The Place of the Military," traces the
American attitude towards the professional soldier and a military class
or caste back to colonial origins. This attitude is reflected in the Court's
opinions from Milligan" to Quirin12 and Toth.13 The difficulties for the
Court are to find the proper place for the military and to keep it there.
The author states that the law in this area "is in a state of ferment rather
than a state of fixity. 1 4
The fifth chapter, entitled "Race and the Constitution," deals with the
fourth great problem area previously mentioned. Before taking up the
cases involving Negroes, which have been and still are those of greatest
importance, the author discusses those concerning Chinese and Japanese
persons, persons of Japanese ancestry, and American Indians. However,
the bulk of the material in this chapter relates to the famous Negro cases
from Dred Scott,15 the Civil Rights Cases,16 and Plessy17 to the school
segregation cases.' 8 The role of the Court in this area has, as is well known,
been under heavy attack for the past four years. The Court has been
charged with usurping congressional functions. What has actually
happened, it would seem, is that the modern role of the Court in this
area parallels what has been done in the area of regulation of business.
It is largely a corrective role. Errors committed by the Court in the past
require correction which in many cases only the Court itself can bring
about. Sometimes a constitutional amendment has seemed to be the
only remedy. As a matter of constitutional history, however, as is shown
time and again in Professor Swisher's book, the Court has corrected its
previous mistakes of constitutional law. It has been remarked that the
Court read laissez faire into the Constitution and subsequently had to
read it out again. Similarly it brought "separate but equal" into the
Constitution and ultimately had to interpret it out again. This correction
had to be made in the face not only of the blunders of Plessy v. Ferger-
son19 but also those made in the Civil Rights Cases,20 as is noted by the
author, in what is, perhaps, the most cogent passage in the book:
But in one important respect the Civil Rights decision closely resembled
the Dred Scott decision. The Dred Scott decision had set up bars to federal
action in an important field, bars that could be removed only by constitu-
10 Ibid.
11 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
12 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
13 United States ex rel.iToth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
14 Text at 136.
15 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
16 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
18 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
10 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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tional amendment, in an area where constitutional language was not clear
and where public sentiment was divided, and the Civil Rights decision set
up similar bars. Here likewise constitutional language was unclear. And
although public sentiment at the time was more in harmony with the
decision, the field was one of political issues about which public sentiment
might well change, as it has done in some degree, leaving the judicial pro-
hibition as a barrier against democratic achievement of political purpose.
In other words, the mood of disillusionment and weariness with protection
of Negro rights proved too ephemeral to serve as an adequate basis for a
statement of constitutional law.
It is not here asserted that Congress in the 1880's was obligated to
enact legislation to protect Negro rights in the face of opposition from the
electorate. That point can be left for speculation or discussion elsewhere.
Certainly it would have been completely constitutional for Congress to
repeal the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Congressional repeal could have been
followed by congressional re-enactment if and when public sentiment
changed. But what we got was in effect repeal by judiciary, in terms such-
that Congress was thereafter barred from enacting a similar measure,
however much it and the people might at some future time desire such
legislation.
It is true, of course, that the constitutional question was decided by the
overwhelming majority of eight to one, and that such weight of opinion is
entitled to respect. Yet the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan as read
today sounds plausible in its statement that "the substance and spirit of
[the] recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a
subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26
(1883).] Justice Harlan emphasized the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment
was not merely prohibitory upon the states, as the majority had implied. Its
first clause was positive, creating and granting both state and federal
citizenship. That which the Constitution created could be protected by
Congress as well as by the judiciary, against all comers and not merely
against the states.2 1
The sixth and last chapter, entitled "The Goal of Judicial Endeavor,"
leans heavily on the works of Justice Cardozo for determination of the
function and nature of the work done by the Court. The author lists
and comments on certain famous phrases that are familiar to students of
constitutional law. Here is the list: police power, political question,
business affected with a public interest, fair return on a fair value,
separate but equal, stream of commerce, rule of reason, clear and
present danger (with the ever less definite "manifest tendency" test), and
primacy of civil liberties.2 2 The author's succint treatment of these phrases
is a valuable refresher for anyone acquainted with them.
Just as the author concludes his remarks by saying that close observers
of the Supreme Court in its modem role commend the Court "to all
who would develop a deeper understanding of man in his struggle toward
higher things,"'2 3 so to the book itself should be commended to all
students of constitutional law and to the legal profession generally for
a rapid survey of recent important constitutional decisions in the con-
text of history. It is a readily readable survey written in sober prose
without rhetorical flourishes and without the heaviness and obscurity
which often mar the writings of learned men. A number of emotionally
charged questions are treated with urbanity and grace. Students and
21 Text at 152-53.
22 Id. at 172.
23 Id. at 191. .
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professors of law can profitably sit at the feet of this professor of
political science. The legal profession is in debt to Professor Swisher
for this book.
Roger Paul Peters*
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